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Protectionism and the EU market for corporate control: Is it possible to get the best of 
both worlds? 
 
Jonathan Mukwiri* 
 
Recent reports of the Commission and the European Parliament have revisited the concerns 
of protectionism in the EU.   This article discusses these concerns in light of the liberal and 
protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control, focusing on the board neutrality 
rule during takeovers.  The arguments advanced in this article are threefold.  First, that 
liberal markets are likely to encourage takeovers, but breed short-termism.  Second, that 
protectionist markets are likely to discourage takeovers, but facilitate long-termism. Third, 
that short-termism in the UK and the so-called protectionism in Germany are the result of 
entrenched policy choices made in those jurisdictions in regard to the interests they protect 
in regulating the market for corporate control.  The article draws a conclusion that it is hard 
for the UK and Germany to get the best of both worlds, that is, the liberal market and long-
termism. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While the discussion on protectionism in the EU market for corporate control is not new,1 
this article contextualises the discussion in the context of the board neutrality rule (‘BNR’).2 
Whilst the BNR would have overcome protectionist barriers that stand in the way of the EU 
market for corporate control, ‘protectionist resistance from numerous Member States has 
hampered the efforts to promote a free market for corporate control.’3  Protectionism is 
generally a negative phrase.  In EU takeovers, the phrase is used negatively to characterise 
choices made by Member States to insulate national companies from takeovers and thereby 
failing to promote the wider interests of the EU.  This type of protectionism is arguably seen 
in the manner that some Member States implemented the Takeover Bids Directive (‘TBD’),4 
opting out of Article 9, essentially to protect their national companies from takeovers.  This is 
reflected in the Commission’s statement that ‘the number of Member States implementing 
the Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly large.’5 
 
The allegation of protectionism in the EU market for corporate control stems from the failure 
by the Commission to achieve census on certain controversial provisions of the draft 
directive.  The TBD was a product of over 30 years of negotiations, characterised by 
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drawbacks, frustration, opposition and compromises.6  Some Member States opposed the 
draft directive because they perceived one of the controversial provisions, the BNR, was 
influenced by the UK and merely designed to break down the laws of Germany, the 
Netherlands and other continental European countries that were hostile to takeovers.7  To 
silence this opposition, a compromise was reached to make Article 9 optional in the TBD.  
As a result of this optionality, implementation failed to create a level playing field in the EU 
market for corporate control, and allegation of protectionism ensued.  The Commission had 
envisioned a mandatory BNR across the EU.  The optionality, which maintained the status 
quo of entrenched national economic interests and barriers to takeovers, was adopted to the 
disappointment of the Commission.  It is from this perspective that the Commission equates 
opting out of the BNR with ‘implementing the Directive in a seemingly protectionist way.’ 
 
This article examines the implications of the choices made by Member States on the BNR, 
creating a liberal and protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control.  It argues 
that liberal markets are likely to encourage takeovers, but breed short-termism.  It also argues 
that protectionist markets are likely to discourage takeovers, but facilitate long-termism.  It 
observes that the application of the BNR in Germany and in the UK is, respectively, illusory 
and strict, and argues that this diverse regulation of takeovers in the two jurisdictions reflect 
the interests they protect.  It argues that short-termism in the UK and the so-called 
protectionism in Germany are the result of entrenched policy choices made in the respective 
jurisdictions on the interests they protect in regulating the market for corporate control.  It 
concludes that it is hard for the UK and Germany to get the best of both the liberal market 
and long-termism. 
 
Discussing these implications, the paper proceeds as follows.  First, it contextualises the 
allegation of protectionism in the EU market for corporate control.  Second, it highlights the 
context of board hostility that feeds into the allegation of protectionism in the EU.  Third, it 
highlights the disadvantages of the UK regulatory regime with its BNR in the context of lack 
of a reciprocal playing field in most major EU countries.  Fourth, it argues that the UK’s 
liberal market attracts short-termism, which militates against long-term industrial economic 
growth.  Fifth, it examines the illusion of a BNR in Germany and its industrial economic 
growth.  Sixth, it looks at the historical policy choices that inform the liberal/short-termism 
and protectionist/long-termism divide.  The final section concludes. 
 
II. Contextualising protectionism in EU takeovers 
 
The phrase ‘protectionism’ is commonly used but rarely defined.  It is mostly used as a 
negative phrase.  In EU takeovers, the phrase is used in relation to how Member States have 
implemented the TBD in a manner protecting their national interests instead of furthering the 
collective EU interests.  But whatever ‘protectionism’ means, most of us would ‘intuitively 
understand attempts to prevent foreign takeovers of local markets and companies as being 
protectionist.’8  In the EU, it is protectionism when a Member State adopts a policy that 
insulates its takeover market contrary to the EU economic freedoms that are founded on ‘the 
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principle of an open market economy with free competition.’9  But it is legally hard to accuse 
Member States of protectionism when the TBD allows options that feed into protectionism. 
 
The phrases ‘protectionism’ and ‘protectionist’ have been common parlance in the rhetoric 
employed by the Commission in seeking to strengthen the internal market via free movement 
of capital.  The stance against protectionism stems from the need to strengthen the unity of 
the Single Market.  To those ends, the Commission has pointed out that the commitment to 
openness to investments and free movement of capital has been a long standing principle of 
the EU and is key to success in an increasingly globalised international system.10  In the area 
of takeovers, national interests are still stronger than EU interests.11  For example, in its 
review of the implementation of the TBD, the Commission found that ‘a large number of 
Member States has shown strong reluctance to lift takeover barriers’ and ‘the number of 
Member States implementing the Directive in a seemingly protectionist way is unexpectedly 
large.’12  The Commission, referring to the benefits of the Single Market, and seeking to 
promote the same values, stated that ‘protectionism and a retreat towards national markets 
can only lead to stagnation, a deeper and longer recession, and lost prosperity.’13 
 
The European Parliament echoes the same rhetoric employed by the Commission, even 
calling upon ‘the Commission to take a strong lead in fighting protectionism.’14  On a number 
of occasions, while discussing ways of strengthening the Single Market, the European 
Parliament ‘expresses its concern that the re-emergence of economic protectionism at 
national level would most probably result in fragmentation of the internal market and a 
reduction in competitiveness, and therefore needs to be avoided.’15 
 
The newspapers have also not been silent, as they have reported instances seen as national 
protectionism.  Four examples from the newspapers will suffice.  First, a 2005 article in the 
Financial Times reported that one Commissioner observed ‘that protectionism was on the 
rise’ not only in ‘certain Member States’ but also ‘all over Europe’ – citing the examples of 
the governments of Italy, France, and Germany, which were putting up ‘proposals to shelter 
companies from foreign takeovers’ and having ‘a situation with financial institutions that can 
take-over somebody else, but nobody can take-over them.’16 Second, a 2014 article in the 
Independent reported that ‘France is the advanced country most prone to protectionism’ and 
the French ‘Government has just appropriated new powers to block foreign takeovers.’17  
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Third, a 2017 article in the Telegraph reported that ‘the German government has approved a 
measure to make it easier for the state to veto takeovers of certain firms by foreign investors;’ 
and that the move ‘come just days after the G20 summit in Hamburg where members reached 
a compromise to “fight protectionism”, while allowing nations to use “legitimate trade 
defence instruments” to protect markets.’18 Fourth, a 2017 article by Reuters, reporting on 
Italy, stated that Italy’s ‘new rules on takeovers signals protectionist sentiment is on the rise 
in Italy after years of relatively open approach to foreign acquisitions which French 
companies, in particular, have taken advantage of.’19  It is not in the collective EU interests 
for Member States to be protectionist in insulating their markets against other Member States. 
 
Protectionism is a tool used to insulate economic interests either at EU level or at national 
level.  Armour and Ringe made this observation: ‘It is important to note that protectionism is 
not only a problem at the national level.  Even trade blocks like the European Union, which 
were set up to overcome trade barriers, are also tempted to use the opportunity to regulate 
particular issues in a protectionist way.’20  Amour and Ringe cited an example of the EU 
Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) in which the proposed Directive 
placed undue restrictions to marketing of non-EU alternative investment funds.  During the 
consultation stage, the UK’s House of Lords observed that the AIFM was ‘protectionist and 
disproportionate’ and concluded that ‘the Directive will seriously damage the EU and UK 
economy unless it is fully compatible with the global approach to the regulation of AIFM and 
it permits the marketing of non-EU funds in the EU’ and recommended that ‘restrictions on 
non-EU managers operating in the EU should also be removed.’21  Whilst protectionism is 
seen as a problem, it is nonetheless used as a tool to protect collective economic interests. 
 
In takeover law, EU protectionism seems to have been at the heart of the formulation of the 
TBD.  This protectionism is evident in the proposal by the Commission of 2002, which, in 
part, stated: ‘the Commission considers it essential to provide a European framework for 
cross-border takeover bids as part of the Financial Services Action Plan.  Such transactions 
can contribute to the development and reorganisation of European firms, a key condition for 
withstanding international competition and developing a single capital market.’22  Arguably, 
the Commission, in subtle ways, sought to use the TBD as an EU protectionist tool to enable 
European firms to withstand international competition. 
 
Protectionism at EU level is seen in the recent proposals to halt a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions of EU firms by foreign investors from China.  In a 2017 staff working document, 
the Commission published the concern about the ‘rising number of takeovers of European 
companies by foreign investors, resulting in a potential loss of control and ownership of 
strategic technologies.’  ‘For example,’ the Commission observed, ‘between 2010 and 2015, 
the number of European companies bought by Chinese companies grew from 91 to 183. In 
turn, European companies only bought 20 Chinese companies.’23  Protectionism at EU level 
is proposed as solution to this rising wave of Chinese takeovers of EU companies.  Thus, in a 
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2017 communication to the EU legislators (European Parliament and Council), the 
Commission pointed to the need ‘to modernise world trade rules,’ ‘especially at a time of 
increasing protectionism’ – in effect, calling for EU level protectionist rules that would strike 
a balance between the need to be open to foreign investment and ‘to protect assets against 
takeovers that would be detrimental to the vital interests of the EU or its Member States.’24 
 
When we talk of protectionism, arguably from the Commission’s perspective, the negative 
connotation of the phrase excludes EU level protectionism, and refers instead to national 
level protectionism.  The legitimacy of acceptability of EU regional level protectionism at the 
exclusion of national level protectionism is derived from the supremacy of EU.  By joining 
the EU, ‘Member States have limited their sovereign rights,’25 agreed to give up their 
national economic interests in exchange for their collective EU economic interests.  A clash 
between national protectionism and EU protectionism is thus resolved in favour of the latter. 
 
Arguably, in the interest of their collective EU economic interests, Member States ought to 
have implemented the TBD in a manner that furthers ‘the development and reorganisation of 
European firms’ and not merely furthering national firms.  But collective EU interests could 
only be secured by a mandatory BNR, which the Commission failed to secure.  But 
‘achieving regulatory differentiation by granting flexibility to the Member States does create 
a risk that the Member States will act strategically in pursuit of protectionist goals.’26  Having 
conceded to allowing Member States to opt out of Article 9, it is then ‘difficult – and 
politically impossible – for the European Commission to challenge decisions made by 
Member States by taking up options explicitly provided for in the Takeover Directive.’27  
With some Members States opting out of Article 9 or opting to have a reciprocity provision 
(Article 12(3)), there was ‘a significant shift away from bidder friendliness.’28  Unable to 
challenge their choices, the Commission could only resort to using the phrase ‘protectionist’ 
to characterise the effect of Member States opting out of Article 9. 
 
The EU project of protecting collective economic interests through the TBD to replace 
national protectionism, has ostensibly failed due to lack of a mandatory BNR.  There was no 
level playing field before the TBD and there is none after the TBD was implemented.  There 
was protectionism of some national markets before the TBD, and making core provisions of 
the TBD optional only entrenched protectionism in some Member States.  Whilst it is hard to 
legally accuse any Member State of protectionism in taking advantage of the options 
provided for in the TBD, such choice reveal that the choices taken in ‘the revision of takeover 
rules has been influenced by the growth of economic nationalism and a desire by Member 
States to preserve corporate headquarter and employing entities within their own 
territories.’29 
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 III. Board hostility during bids and protectionism in the EU 
 
It is here argued that had Article 9 of the TBD been adopted as a mandatory provision, it 
would have curbed any protectionist tendencies and would have underpinned the importance 
of standardised and uniform takeover rules in the EU.  Enriques, Gilson, and Pacces have 
proposed a revision of the TBD so that it is “unbiased” – arguing that ‘takeover regulation 
should neither hamper nor promote takeovers, but instead allow individual companies to 
decide the contestability of their control.’30  Fedderke and Ventoruzzo have, quite 
convincingly, rejected the “unbiased” EU takeover law proposal as likely to ‘multiply 
existing variations of company-specific rules.’31  On the same page, in rejecting the 
“unbiased” EU takeover law proposal, Fedderke and Ventoruzzo pose an interesting 
question: ‘Are we sure that municipal protectionist tendencies would not find a fertile ground 
in such a scenario, and actually ring-fence national markets for corporate control in Europe, 
therefore killing the development of a continental market?’  Arguably, these protectionist 
tendencies would have been curbed by a “biased” mandatory BNR.  In the optionality of 
Article 9 of the TBD we have, in Member States that have opted out under Article 12 of the 
TBD, traces of board hostility during takeover bids, which feeds into protectionist tendencies. 
 
For Germany, securing board hostility during takeover bids in order to protect national 
interests can be traced back to the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the TBD.  
Leading up to the vote on the second draft of the framework takeover directive, the Council 
had unanimously agreed a Common Position on 19 June 2000, which would have included a 
mandatory BNR.  While the majority Members States were posed to vote in favour of the 
provision, Germany’s Chancellor Schroder had a sudden change of mind due to national 
interest to protect the giant German carmaker, Volkswagen.  It is said that the 
‘representatives of car maker Volkswagen had met with Schroder just before and convinced 
him of the threat to Volkswagen by the draft directive.’32  To protect national interests of 
Germany, Chancellor Schroder rejected the Common Position, and lobbied to reject the draft 
takeover directive. Germany opposed the draft directive in 2001 by threatening not to back 
the directive ‘unless shareholder approval for frustrating action were eliminated from Article 
9 or the entire article were removed from the directive.’33  Following this threatening from 
Germany, in a 273-273-tie vote on 4 July 2001, a German MEPs-led coalition rejected a draft 
directive text that was heavily influenced by the UK’s City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers.34  Alluding to national protectionism that led to the rejection of the draft directive, 
the then Internal Market Commissioner, Frits Bolkestein, commented that, ‘it is tragic to see 
how Europe’s broad interests can be frustrated by certain narrow interests.’35 
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 Germany opted out of the BNR of Article 9 in order to protect German companies.  It is 
argued in favour of Germany that, ‘owing to the lack of a level playing field, German 
companies still require protection.  This protection through the opt-out from the neutrality 
duty is necessary in order to compensate for the lack of protective hindrances brought about 
by the comparatively wide opening of the German capital market.’36  It is interesting to note 
that, the refusal of Germany to accept the unanimous Common Position of the Council of 
June 2000 opened the way to the subsequent optionality of the BNR, which entrenched the 
lack of a level playing field, and now this lack of a level playing field is argued by some as 
the justification for protectionism in Germany.  Having opted-out of Article 9, Germany 
retained the ability to frustrate takeovers without shareholder approval, as the management 
may take actions with supervisory board’s consent, or actions which a prudent and 
conscientious manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid would have taken.37 
 
Interestingly, protectionism in Germany seems to correlate to long-term investor culture.  The 
traditional German corporate governance model tends towards long-term sustainability of the 
company, with its ethos of managerial primacy, even in takeovers.  Although the traditional 
German corporate model of ‘Deutschland AG’ is said to be eroding,38 managers in German 
companies are still able to pursue long-term investment policies, such as product quality and 
innovation, because they are less affected by outside pressures from short-term takeover 
traders.  In all, managers within the traditional German corporate governance model have 
significant discretion upon which the major constraint is the interests of employees probably 
followed by the interests of families, banks, affiliated companies and the government, which 
discretion has been sustained historically by a notion of long-term commitment between the 
company and its various stakeholders.39  Thus, the BNR in Article 9 of the Directive goes 
against the basic tenet of company law in Germany and many other Member States: that it is 
not for the shareholders to decide the future of the company, but for the management taking 
all stakeholders’ interest into account.40 
 
Thus, the board hostility position in Germany is borne from the policy choice of what 
constitutes the interests of the company that must be protected.  Arguably, although Germany 
opted out of Article 9, Germany is still subject to Article 3(1)(c), which requires that the 
offeree board must act in the ‘interests of the company as a whole’ and must not deny 
shareholders the opportunity to decide on the bid.  In the context of the TBD, ‘interests of the 
company as a whole’ is not a reference to the shareholders, but rather to the company as an 
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enterprise.41  Article 3 require balancing between acting in the interest of the enterprise and 
not denying shareholders the opportunity to decide on the bid.  In Germany, interests of the 
company is the sum of multiple interests of all stakeholders, as such, ‘in a takeover situation, 
management may take action frustrating the bid if this appears justified in balancing the 
different interests involved.’42  Arguably, for Germany, a protectionism charge is rebuttable. 
 
For Belgium, adopting a board hostility position was a natural consequence of not having a 
strict BNR before the transposition of the TBD.  It was reported that ‘Belgium has opted out 
of the so-called “rule of passivity” enshrined in Article 9 of the Takeover Directive.’43  For 
companies having their registered office in Belgium and having their securities traded on the 
regulated market in Belgium, during a takeover bid, the board may take action to frustrate the 
bid without having to obtain shareholder approval.  Two easy provisos are placed on the 
board.  First, the proviso that all actions taken by the board to frustrate a takeover bid are 
subject to the supervision of competent authority, the Financial Services and Markets 
Authority.44  Second, the proviso that all actions taken by the board to frustrate a takeover bid 
are subject to the general companies law, to act in the interest of the offeree company as a 
whole (i.e. interests of shareholders, creditors and employees).45 
 
Other two Member States that maintain out right opt-out of Article 9 of the TBD are 
Luxembourg and Denmark.  In Luxembourg, pursuant to the law of 19 May 2006 on takeover 
bids, the board of the offeree company can take action to frustrate a takeover bid without first 
obtaining shareholder approval.  This is still subject to taking such action in the interest of the 
company as a whole, which the board often will justify.  It is interesting to note that this law 
was adopted during the audacious hostile takeover for the Luxembourg steel giant Arcelor by 
Mittal Steel.  Here is a brief background: in January 2006, Mittal announced a hostile 
takeover of Arcelor; in February 2006, the Luxembourg Government announced a Bill to 
implement the TBD; in May 2006, the Luxembourg Parliament voted the Bill into law; and in 
June 2006, Mittal succeeded to takeover Arcelor.  In the course of the Bill in Parliament, the 
Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce tabled an amendment aimed at protecting Arcelor and 
swatting the takeover of Arcelor by Mittal.46  Whilst the Chambers’ amendment would have 
rendered the law more protectionist, thereby interfering with an ongoing takeover bid and 
probably frustrate it, the Luxembourg Parliament preserved freedom of trade and did not 
adopt the Chamber’s position.47  Nonetheless, by empowering directors to take defensive 
measures without shareholder approval, the Luxembourg takeover law of 19 May 2006 
confined hostile takeover to history.  In Denmark, the board is not subject to Article 9 of the 
TBD, and therefore can take action to frustrate a takeover bid without shareholder approval.  
In both Luxembourg and Denmark, companies may provide in their articles of association for 
the board to maintain neutrality during bids, though this is rare. 
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 IV. The BNR in the UK 
 
The importance of the BNR in shaping takeover law and facilitating takeover bids should not 
be underestimated. A common argument against the BNR is that it is only relevant in 
dispersed structures like the UK and not in concentrated structures like Germany.  Davies, 
Schuster, and de Ghelcke, convincingly, ‘argue that the view that the BNR has importance 
only in the UK is misplaced.’48  Among other reasons, they argue that, in insecure 
blockholder control situations, which are common in Europe, restriction on the board’s power 
to prevent the bid being put to all shareholders facilitate bids even in concentrated structures.  
It is here argued that a strict BNR removes the potential for board conflict of interest even in 
concentrated structures.  In Germany, where the management board may take defensive 
measure with the approval of the supervisory board, Mathias Habersack argues that ‘the 
conflict of interest in the person of the management board is intensified’ because ‘the 
supervisory board fear to be dismissed once the takeover is completed’, and ‘the employee 
representatives also fear reorganisation.’49 Arguably, such conflict of interest would be 
removed by a strict BNR.  Marco Ventoruzzo argues that the fact that several continental 
European countries, such as Italy and France, that have concentrated ownership structures, 
had adopted the BNR long before the TBD, suggests the importance of the rule goes beyond 
the divide of dispersed and concentrated ownership structures.50  Although Italy and France 
had adopted the BNR before the TBD, both have since introduced protectionist takeover 
rules.  France has since promoted protectionist reforms, passing in 2014 the openly 
protectionist Loi Florange and repealing the BNR.51  Arguably, in most major continental 
jurisdictions the BNR is not negated by shareholdings structures, but by protectionism. 
 
Increasingly, most major continental states are moving towards protectionism.  Compared to 
other major European jurisdictions, the UK operates the strictest BNR.  ‘All the major 
continental jurisdictions make it possible for companies to avoid the “no frustration” rule 
(with varying degrees of flexibility).’52 ‘To complicate matters further, with Brexit the very 
member state which is seen by many to offer model takeover regulation with a mandatory 
[BNR] will leave the EU and will, therefore, loose its influence over EU law.’53  Some have 
taken issue with measuring failure or success of EU takeover law by the use of the BNR, 
contained in Article 9 of the TBD, and suggested that the BNR is trivial in the sense that 
takeover defences could be regulated at company level without this rule.54  Convincingly, 
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others have rejected the triviality argument, defending the BNR as a general rule that covers 
any defensive action and a rule that is not open to evasion by the creation of new defences.55 
 
The members of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts56 were fully convinced that 
the UK model of takeover regulation with its BNR57 would best serve EU economic interests.  
Takeovers in the UK are subject to the BNR, and the UK opted into Article 9 of the TBD.58  
The BNR has been a feature of regulations of takeovers in the UK since the early 1960s.  
Partly due to this long history of maintaining the BNR, hostile takeovers59 are common in the 
UK than in any other EU Member State.  In their study of European M&A, Marina 
Martynova and Luc Renneboog found that ‘most hostile bids are concentrated in the UK’ 
than in other European countries.60  Although only a small number of takeovers tend to be 
hostile, the fact that they mostly occur in the UK, is in itself evidence of the importance of 
the BNR: it effectively facilitates a liberal market for corporate control.  But in light of 
concerns of increasing short-termism in the UK, if, as it seems, easy facilitation of takeovers 
encourage short-termism, then it suggests that it is hard to have both the regulatory advantage 
of a liberal market and long-termism. 
 
But for the core provision of the TBD, Article 9, having been reduced to an optional 
provision, the Directive would have provided for the EU what the City Code provides for the 
UK – removal of barriers that may frustrate free movement of capital by way of takeover 
activities. One problem with having on one hand the UK applying the BNR and on the other 
hand some of the major capital markets in the EU opting out of the rule, is it creates 
‘discrimination with respect to defensive measures against hostile takeovers.’61  In EU 
Member States that have opted out of Article 9, hostile takeovers are not facilitated, offeree 
boards may take actions to frustrate bids without shareholder approval, and that makes 
bidding for shares in those jurisdictions less attractive to investors.62 The optionality of 
Article 9 creates a liberal/protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control, with 
some EU states offering a liberal and some EU States a protectionist market. 
 
It is ironic that, whilst the TBD was modelled on the UK’s City Code, owing to the 
optionality of the BNR in the TBD, most of the EU Member States do not share the UK’s 
regulatory approach.  Arguably, but for the optionality of the BNR, for over 30 years the 
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Commission sought to model the Directive on the UK rules, so that the EU shares the UK’s 
regulatory advantage.  The TBD has since created new standards based on optionality – 
opting into Article 9 to create a free liberal market, or opting out of Article 9 to create a 
protectionist market.  Some have suggested that the UK may need to meet the new standards 
or lose its regulatory advantages if its rules are more stringent.63  It is here suggested that the 
UK would lose its position as a regional financial centre and a liberal market if the UK were 
to take a protectionist standard. 
 
V. Short-termism in the UK market for corporate control 
 
Some have argued that the UK’s liberal market has led to easy hostile takeovers that have led 
to the ‘financialisation’ of many British businesses.  One 2010 article in Financial Times was 
very critical of the UK liberal market, observing that: ‘this liberal openness is a great asset, 
but it must be proportionate.  Takeovers are a crucial part of capitalism, but the current 
regime is a charter for a great sell-off of British assets.  The rules of the game are tilted to 
favour hostile takeovers.  Too many great UK companies have disappeared.’64  Despite these 
criticisms, UK regulation of takeovers still provides the most liberal market in the world. 
 
The UK liberal market for corporate control is well placed to attract and protect investors.  
This is borne from the policy choice of having a strict BNR, which focuses on the interests of 
shareholders, and disarms incumbent offeree boards of the ability to mount defensive in a bid 
to secure their jobs.  Given that shareholders own the shares, the City Code places the 
decision to transact in shares squarely in the hands of shareholders.  It provides a free 
platform for even foreign bidders to acquire shares in UK companies, which investment in 
turn boasts the UK economy.  It provides a market for shareholders to cash in for shares and 
obtain the often much needed liquidity and return on investment.  But this often means that 
long-term shareholders sell their shares to short-term traders.  As such, this highly acclaimed 
liberal market for corporate control is both UK’s strength and its weakness. 
 
In recent years, an example of the weakness of the UK’s liberal market was demonstrated by 
the controversial takeover of Cadbury (a UK chocolate maker company) by Kraft (a US food 
company).  The history of Cadbury is traced back to 1824 when John Cadbury first begun his 
chocolate shop in Birmingham (UK), which over the century and decades developed into a 
giant UK chocolate company until taken-over by Kraft in 2010.65  The controversial story of 
the takeover of Cadbury was well summarised in the 2010 report of the House of Commons 
Select Committee.66  In 2007, Cadbury announced its plan to close one of its factories, 
Somerdale Factory (near Bristol, UK), and by 2010 move the factory’s production to Poland.  
In a bid to take over Cadbury, in 2009 Kraft announced it would reverse Cadbury’s decision 
and keep the Somerdale Factory opened in the UK.  Just a week after the takeover, Kraft 
announced that it was closing the Somerdale Factory and moving production to Poland.  A 
number of Reviews were conducted into the Cadbury/Kraft takeover, and commendably so, 
the Reviews rejected taking a protectionist standard against foreign takeovers, as this would 
weaken the UK’s position as a regional financial centre. 
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 In April 2010, the House of Commons Select Committee published its review of the Cadbury 
takeover.  In its report, the House of Commons stated that, ‘Kraft acted both irresponsibly 
and unwisely in making its original statement that it believed it could keep Somerdale open’ 
and that it left Kraft to a charge that Kraft may have ‘used a “cynical ploy” to cast a positive 
light on Kraft during its takeover of Cadbury.’  The House of Commons Committee was 
‘deeply concerned by reports that the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft was ultimately decided 
by institutional investors motivated by short-term profits rather than those investors who had 
the company’s long-term interests at heart.’67  In its conclusion, the House of Commons 
Committee welcomed the plans of the UK Government and the Takeover Panel to review 
UK’s takeover legislation and rules, but advised that: ‘any review should not be a disguise for 
protectionism against foreign takeovers. It needs to address all takeover activity, whether 
entirely domestic or by foreign companies, to ensure that such activity is conducted in the 
best interests of the UK economy.’68  Ruling out protectionism was commendable, for it was 
unlikely to negate short-termism.  Subsequently, a number of reviews were published. 
 
In October 2010, the Code Committee of the Takeover Panel published a response report 
following a public consultation.69  This was in response to public concerns over the fact that, 
(i) it had become too easy for hostile offerors to succeed, and (ii) outcome of hostile offers 
being influenced unduly by the actions of short-term investors.  Addressing the former, the 
Code Committee promised to bring proposal forward to amend the Code to reduce offeror 
tactical advantage and redress the balance in favour of the offeree company.70  The unfairness 
of inducement fees is that where they give the first offeror a significant advantage, other 
offerors may be deterred from bidding thus depriving shareholders of additional premium the 
competing bid would have brought.71  The prohibition of inducement fees levels the playing 
field for offerors, it facilitates fairer hostile takeovers and increases fairness in the market.  
Addressing the latter, it had been suggested that the ability of short-term investors to 
influence the outcome of offers should be restricted by (a) disenfranchising shares acquired 
during the offer period, and (b) introducing a qualifying period prior to shares carrying votes.  
While the Code Committee was of the view that (a) could be introduced through changes in 
company law and could be consistent with the Code, it was of the view that (b) would run 
contrary to the concept of ‘equivalent treatment’ for all shareholders in the same class as 
enshrined in General Principle 1.72  This principle is reflected in Article 3(1)(a) of the TBD. 
 
In July 2012, a review of the short-term investment in UK equity markets, conducted by 
Professor John Kay, as commissioned by the UK Government, was published.73  One of the 
weaknesses of the UK’s liberal market is that it is open to attract short-term investors whose 
only interest may lie in making quick gains and then reselling their shares without regard for 
the long-term industrial and economic growth.  The central question for the Kay Review was 
on the extent of short-termism, ‘whether capital markets in Britain dissuade or stimulate the 
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search for instant gratification in the corporate sector.’74  The Kay Review examined the 
possibility that short-term decisions may have led to the disappearance of British companies 
ICI and GEC, resulting into loss of British industrial lead, and as a result of this loss, 
‘German competitors BASF and Siemens are now respectively the leading chemical and 
engineering companies in the world.’75  Whilst acknowledging that the rise of companies is 
central to the dynamic of a market economy, the Kay Review asked, rhetorically, ‘where are 
Britain’s Amazons, Apples or Googles?’  The Kay Review blamed this to short-termism 
culture.  It also noted with regret, ‘the financialisation of UK business, the rise of the would-
be meta-fund manager, and the tendency for some chief executives to be preoccupied with 
deal making rather than developing competitive advantages in operating businesses.’76 
 
In February 2013, an independent review of the growing short-termism problem in UK equity 
markets, conducted by Sir George Cox, as commissioned by the Labour Party, was 
published.77  The Cox Review made a number of observations.  The Cox Review observed 
that the UK market is amongst the most open in the world for inward foreign investment.  
The Cox Review observed that whilst welcoming foreign investment in UK companies, there 
was widespread concern that the openness of UK markets both lays UK open to predators and 
puts key industries in the hands of organisations for which the UK operation was not 
necessarily a priority consideration.  The Cox Review observed that in other jurisdictions, 
takeovers are subjected to national interest.  It cited for example, in the US, regulation 
prohibits a majority foreign ownership of companies in several key industries.  It also cited 
for example, in China one can only get involved in joint ventures that guarantee a measure of 
skills transfer.  Despite examples of US and China, the Cox Review advised, ‘for the UK to 
erect any such barrier to international investment would be a backward step in the opening up 
of global capital markets where the UK has been a leader.’78 
 
In July 2013, the House of Commons Select Committee published another review into the 
issues raised the previous year in the Kay Review.79  The Select Committee heard evidence to 
the effect that the nature of UK’s liberal market for corporate control meant that long-term 
shareholders often chose to sell their shares to short-term investors.  But the Committee also 
heard evidence that, ‘overall, takeovers detract value from companies.’  The Committee 
noted the commitment of the Secretary of State to ‘consider introducing differential votes 
(i.e. encouraging the principle that short-term traders should have no influence over the 
takeover vote).’80  The House of Commons Select Committee made a recommendation that 
the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills should study the feasibility of ‘introducing 
a policy that differentiates between shareholders and voting rights based on the length of time 
a share has been held.’81  The effect of introducing such a differential voting policy or 
legislation would be to limit short-term shareholders’ ability to influence takeover outcome. 
 
In October 2014, the Department of Business Innovation and Skills published its feasibility 
study report into the practical and legal implications of a ‘differential votes’ policy designed 
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to resolve the short-termism problem.82  According to the Government, limiting short-term 
shareholders’ ability to influence takeover outcome, would require a ‘differential votes’ 
legislative mechanism, in that, (a) voting rights would be limited to rights the shares had at 
the offer period commencement date; (b) any shares sold after that point would result in the 
loss of the voting rights attached to those shares for those purposes; and (c) any shares 
purchased after that point would not have voting rights for those purposes for the duration of 
the offer period.  One legal question was whether ‘differential votes’ legislative mechanism 
would be compatible with Article 3(1)(a) of the TBD, which states: ‘all holders of the 
securities of an offeree company of the same class must be afforded equivalent treatment.’  
That it is contentious legal question and there are no easy legal answers to short-termism, is 
revealed by the Department’s findings that ‘there was no clear agreement among the lawyers 
present on this question,’ as ‘some argued that it would not be compatible with the 
requirement for equal treatment,’ while ‘others expressed the view that the measure could be 
designed in a way which was consistent with this principle.’83 The Department abandoned the 
legislative mechanism on three broad grounds: ‘[i] there were a series of legal and technical 
implementation issues which would be extremely difficult to overcome; [ii] the practical 
consequences and impacts of a disenfranchisement measure risked being at best ineffective 
and at worst damaging; and [iii] it appeared unlikely that a disenfranchisement measure 
would eliminate the influence of short-term shareholders in a takeover bid.’84 
 
The use of differential voting rights as, albeit a limited, solution to short-termism, was in 
2011 proposed by the Reflection Group, who recommended that EU regulation should allow 
companies across the EU to have the option to include clauses allowing for differential voting 
rights in their Articles of Association.85  The Commission proposed to amend the Shareholder 
Rights Directive into what has become known as Shareholder Rights Directive II (SRD II).  
In its report of 12 May 2015, the Committee on Legal Affairs proposed amendments to the 
European Parliament, which would include inserting into the SRD II a provision grating 
additional voting rights to long-term shareholders who have held their shares for not be less 
than two years.86  Similarly, in France, the Florange Act, adopted 29 March 2014, provides 
for automatic double-voting rights to shares held by the same shareholder for at least two 
years, unless the company prohibits double-voting rights in articles of association.  Inserting 
differential voting rights into the SRD II met with resistance from institutional investors who 
argued that “differential voting rights can have unintended consequences leading to the 
disenfranchisement of minority shareholders” and would “impact on the attractiveness of 
European markets for global investment.”87  In the final text of the SRD II, the European 
Parliament and the Council did not adopt differential voting rights.88 
 
With differential voting not included in the SRD II, to provide, albeit a limited, solution, 
short-termism is posed to remain not only a UK problem, but also a EU problem.  Earlier in a 
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2011 Green Paper, the Commission found that, ‘the majority of shareholders are passive and 
are often only focused on short-term profits.’89  As if conceding to short-termism, the 
Commission accepted ‘that not all investors need to engage with investee companies’ and 
that ‘investors are free to choose a short-term-oriented investment model without 
engagement.’90  This lack of engagement tends to short-termism, creating a cyclical effect in 
equity markets.  Jonathan Mukwiri and Mathias Siems have argued that the backdrop to this 
lack of shareholder engagement is the fact that investors who largely contribute to corporate 
liquidity tend to be short-term investors.  Mukwiri and Siems observe that boards of financial 
firms striving to keep solvent and therefore in need of liquidity, pushed by stock market price 
index performance measures, are likely to have little choice but to focus on short-term 
demands of short-term liquidity providers.91  As rejected by the UK Reviews, taking a 
protectionist standard is unlikely to resolve the problem of short-termism, as it would most 
likely weaken UK’s position as a regional financial centre.  With no clear legal answers to 
short-termism, given that the UK market is more liberal than the EU market, it is likely that 
UK will continue to suffer with the short-termism problem more than the rest of the EU. 
 
It is here argued that, in the UK, the focus on the interests of shareholders, rather than the 
company at large, in the context of takeovers, is linked to short-termism.  Short-termism is 
facilitated by the regulatory framework that focuses on serving the interests of shareholders.  
A most influential class of shareholders whose interests are served by UK Takeover Code is 
institutional shareholders.  According to Armour and Skeel, institutional shareholders have 
historically influenced the Code to serve their own interests.  Armour and Skeel argued that, 
 
‘given that investors cannot easily exit the market, each institution recognizes that if it is 
not involved in influencing a change, others might do so in a way that harms its interests. 
Hence, the observed strategy was one of coordinated lobbying for rules that were expected 
to maximize the joint welfare of institutional investors. The Takeover Code is a good 
example. Institutional investors were involved at every stage of the drafting of the Code, 
right from its beginnings as the “Notes.”  Because institutional investors have a clear 
interest in rules that maximise expected gains to shareholders, it is not surprising that the 
emergence of a pro-shareholder approach to takeover regulation coincided with the 
emergence of institutional investors as a significant force in British share ownership.’92 
 
Having influenced the Code to provide easy entry and easy exist, institutional shareholders 
who are inclined to short-term profits are quick to sell their shares to hostile bidders. Such 
shareholders often have a short-term focus, as they may have purchased the shares after the 
bid has been announced in order to make a quick gain, should the takeover succeed, with no 
interest in the future of the company once they have accepted the offer and exited the 
company.93  With short-term shareholders, regulators have no easy solution to short-termism. 
 
One reason why regulars have no easy solution to short-termism is because shareholders have 
a right to sell their shares and have no duty of loyalty to the company.  This right stems from 
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the fact that in English law, whilst shareholders do not own the capital of the company, they 
own the share, for ‘the share, although it is a fraction of the capital, is the property of the 
corporator.’94  In other words, ‘the shares or other interest of a member in a company are 
personal property.’95  Shareholders are free to sell their shares in contractual offers.  ‘As the 
company as a legal entity is unaffected by the sale of the shares resulting from a contractual 
offer, we might expect that the company as an entity has no role in deciding whether or not 
the share sale from A to B should take place.’96  Whilst companies may, in their articles of 
association, restrict share transfers and therefore prevent shareholders selling their shares to 
short-term investors, listed companies must have their shares freely transferable.97  Unless the 
culture of shareholders changes from short-term to long-term orientation, regulators have no 
easy solution to short-termism, as shareholders may freely sell to short-term investors. 
 
VI. Illusion of a BNR in Germany 
 
Unlike in the UK, hostile takeovers are alien in Germany.  Hostile takeovers are just not the 
way the Germans do business.  As such, German boards do not sit neutral to watch hostile 
raiders taking over and stripping the assets of the company they have built up.  Germany is 
among the largest and richest industrial economies, and many German companies are world 
leaders in their fields.98  It is understandable that Germany, having recovered from the 1870s 
long depression and developed its industrial economy, would seek to protect the country’s 
threatened industrial economy.  To recover from economic depression, Germany focused on 
long-term investment in human capital – hence employee protection and employee co-
determination in corporate governance – and on long-term technological and organisational 
investment.  Thus, the German economic power lends itself to the historical corporate 
governance structures and legal framework in Germany.  To protect against the effects of the 
1873 stock market collapse, by 1884 corporate law reform in Germany had introduced a 
corporate governance structure composed of a two-tier board: the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand) – a structure that had its roots in the 
Verwaltungsrat, a body on which shareholders, bankers and other entrepreneurs were 
represented – a structure designed not per se for shareholders to hold directors accountable, 
but to protect the public interest and to avoid exploitation of stakeholders.99  While hostile 
takeovers, and to a large extent the stock markets, generally favour shareholders’ interests, 
German corporate governance favour wider corporate interests, which boards are duty bound 
to protect.  As it is discussed below, German law empowers boards to resist hostile takeovers. 
 
Hostile takeovers are alien in Germany.  ‘The successful hostile takeover by the UK-
headquartered Vodafone of the Germany-based Mannesmann might seem to be a spectacular 
counter-example, but arguably this was not in ownership terms a cross-border acquisition as 
more than two-thirds of the shares in Mannesmann were held by foreigners, mainly 
institutional investors based in the UK and the US.’100  The nature of shareholding in 
Mannesmann, who were mostly foreigners, facilitated for the hostile takeover.  ‘While some 
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German funds were thought to be loyal to Mannesmann, foreign investors held over 60% of 
shares, including 40% held by US and British investors alone.’101 
 
Moreover, a hostile takeover would not have succeeded but for managers being in breach of 
the fiduciary duty to protect the interest of Mannesmann by continuing to resist the takeover 
by Vodafone.  In November 1999, Vodafone approached Mannesmann for a friendly 
merger/takeover.  This was rejected.  A hostile takeover ensued.  The deal closed in March 
2000 after Mannesmann mangers were persuaded to recommend the offer; and after the 
takeover, they received almost 60 million euros in awards and pensions.  A criminal trial 
against former Mannesmann managers followed.  Prosecutors argued that the payments were 
illegal because they were designed to persuade managers to drop their resistance to 
Vodafone’s bid after the long takeover battle.102  The case was settled in 2006 with managers 
agreeing to pay back some of the money.  As the Vodafone/Mannesmann takeover succeeded 
partly due managerial misconduct, it is arguable that it is not a good example of hostile 
takeovers in Germany, and that hostile and/or foreign takeovers remain alien in Germany. 
 
Turning to ‘re-emergence of economic protectionism,’103 in regards to Germany, this may 
probably refer to the protectionism of the 1880s.  In 1873, Germany experienced the 
Grunderkrise, a term referring to the German stock market collapse.  In the aftermath of that 
stock market collapse, having recovered from the long depression, Germany moved ‘away 
from liberal economic policies such as free trade and competition, to protectionism, a distrust 
of stock exchange finance and the encouragement of cartelization.’104  Germany was seeking 
long-term stability, which the stock exchange did not seem to provide.  Small or dispersed 
holdings, prevalent players on stock exchange, were discouraged in favour of block or 
concentrated holdings.  One feature of stock exchange is to provide shareholders easy entry 
and exit from companies by the market of their shares.  This encouraged short-termism, 
which the German lawmakers were cautious to avoid.  To the German lawmakers, ‘such 
“democracy” that would give voice to small shareholders was widely considered undesirable 
due to their short-term interests and ability to exit.’105  In order to protect long-term industrial 
economy, Germany developed a corporate governance model that views the interests of the 
company to be wider than shareholders, to include all stakeholders: shareholders, employees, 
creditors, and industrial partners.  Thus, in the German corporate governance, the interests of 
the company that are protected during takeover bids are ‘defined as the sum of the multiple 
interests of all company stakeholders, that is, shareholders, employees, creditors and the 
concerned general public (for instance, the municipality where production facilities are 
located).’106  Call it protectionism, but while in the UK, short-term/liberalism led to the 
disappearance of British firms such as ICI and GEC, resulting into loss of British industrial 
lead, in Germany, due to long-term/protectionism, ‘German competitors BASF and Siemens 
are now respectively the leading chemical and engineering companies in the world.’107   
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 In historical German corporate law, prior to the TBD, there was no place for a strictly 
English-equivalent of a BNR, even as contained in Article 9 of the TBD.  A strict BNR 
favours hostile takeovers and militates against German corporate governance model of 
protecting, even during takeovers, wider company interests.  German law, in opting out of 
Article 9 of the TBD, reinforces the historical duty of boards to protect the wider company 
interests beyond shareholders.  Analysing the German law in relation to a strict BNR, Davies, 
Schuster, and Ghelcke give a number of reasons arguing that a BNR in Germany would have 
been a significant departure from the existing law.108  They make an observation that German 
law contained in the Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act, starts from a board neutrality 
principle, but dilutes the BNR by creating three exceptions to it.  First, the management board 
may take defensive measures with a post-bid approval of the supervisory board.  Second, the 
management board may obtain pre-bid shareholder approval for defensive measures.  Third, 
the Act authorises the management board to take actions which a diligent and conscientious 
manager not subject to a takeover offer would have also taken – without imposing 
requirement for supervisory board approval.  Mathias Habersack affirms that ‘with regards to 
German law it cannot be denied that a strict [BNR] would have a “constitutive” effect, i.e. 
that it would prohibit the management board from taking defensive actions which pursuant to 
general stock corporation law it would be allowed to take.’109  Referring to some examples, 
Habersack argues that those ‘examples show very clearly that the management board and the 
supervisory board of a German company which is confronted with a takeover bid are well 
placed to take such defensive measures, which they would not be able to take if a strict 
[BNR] applied.’ 
 
The BNR is found in section 33 of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act.  The 
relevant part is subsection 1, sentences 1 and 2, which states: 
 
After publication of the decision to make an offer and until publication of the result 
pursuant to section 23 sentence 1 no.2, the board of management of the target company 
may not take any actions which could prevent the success of the offer.  This does not 
apply to actions which a prudent and conscientious manager of a company not affected by 
a takeover bid would have taken, to endeavours to find a competing offer, or to actions 
consented to by the supervisory board of the target company. 
 
The reference in sentence 2 above to ‘prudent and conscientious manager of a company not 
affected by a takeover bid’ needs to be read in conjunction with section 93 paragraph 1 
sentences 1 and 2 of the German Stock Corporation Act, which states: 
 
In conducting business, the members of the management board shall employ the care of a 
diligent and conscientious manager.  They shall not be deemed to have violated the 
aforementioned duty if, at the time of taking the entrepreneurial decision, they had good 
reason to assume that they were acting on the basis of adequate information for the benefit 
of the company. 
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How should we read the BNR contained in the German law above?  Most important, one 
implication is that it provides an illusion of board neutrality, which in effect is taken away by 
the exceptions, especially the third exception – the actions of ‘a prudent and conscientious 
manager of a company not affected by a takeover bid.’  What in essence section 33(2) of 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act does is to authorise the management board to 
completely ignore the takeover bid situation as longer as the board is within the boundaries 
contained in section 93(1) of the Stock Corporation Act, that is, ‘acting on the basis of 
adequate information for the benefit of the company.’  Keep in mind that ‘the benefit of the 
company’ or its interests, in Germany, are wider than shareholder interests.  So, for example, 
on the question of whether new shares should be issued, the target’s directors need not 
consider the effects of the share issuance on an outstanding public offer and the financial 
interests of the company’s shareholders, and can go ahead with the share issuance even if this 
will frustrate the bid and even if this is an unwelcome side-effect of an otherwise sound 
business measure.110  The former Act permits the management board to perform the duty of 
loyalty to balance stakeholder interests required by the latter Act without taking into account 
that shareholder interests in the bid might be frustrated.  Thus, ‘a company already pursuing 
an acquisition strategy could continue (and even accelerate?) it in the face of a bid, even if 
fully aware that the acquisition would render the company a less attractive target.’111 
 
But one may ask, if the above reading of the German law exception is correct, how do we 
read the first sentence: ‘the board of management of the target company may not take any 
actions which could prevent the success of the offer’ (section 33(1) Securities Acquisition 
and Takeover Act)?  Given the exception discussed above, it is submitted that the prohibited 
actions only refer to those actions that would not be taken by a ‘diligent and conscientious 
manager’ and actions that would not be for ‘the benefit of the company’ outside a takeover 
bid situation.  For example, if the management board where, in order to frustrate a bid, sell 
off corporate assets and divide among themselves the proceeds.  As general rules of company 
law (fiduciary duties) would still apply to frustrating actions, the prohibition in section 33(1) 
simply says directors may frustrate a takeover bid subject to fiduciary duties to the company. 
 
VII. Get the best of both worlds? 
 
The foregoing has discussed the short-term and long-term investment goals, and the liberal 
and protectionist divide in the EU market for corporate control.  But can liberal markets and 
long-term goals coexist?  As company law experts have said, ‘we do not have a very 
sophisticated understanding’ of what such strategies may achieve for individual companies.  
‘Some intervention by investors with short-term goals is good because it brings about change 
which long-term investors want but cannot themselves cheaply bring about. Sometimes long-
term support for a company means keeping inefficient incumbent management in place.  But 
equally, the opposites of these propositions also hold true in some cases.’112  But can we get 
both liberal market and long-term investment at national level? The EU market for corporate 
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control is affronted by two problems: the so-called protectionism and short-termism.  These 
two problems are the antitheses of liberal market and long-term investment, respectively. 
 
In the UK, the market has long acquiesced to the normative notion that companies should be 
run primarily in the interests of shareholders, and directors are perceived as primarily serving 
the interests of shareholders.  Performance of directors in listed companies is measure against 
share price index.  The Myners Review found that the culture of institutional shareholders 
favours short-termism, as their fund managers cling closely to share market indices, making 
the work of directors in pursing long-term goals near-impossible.113  Often, ‘due to the threat 
of hostile takeovers, some directors may tend to act in the short term interests of their 
shareholders – to keep the shareholders satisfied so they would reject any takeover offer and, 
therefore, to keep the directors (it is hoped) in control of the management of the company.’114  
The backdrop to the problem is the culture of shareholders who provide capital to the 
companies.  Investors who largely contribute to corporate liquidity tend to be short-term 
investors; and boards of firms striving to keep solvent and therefore in need of liquidity, 
pushed by stock market price index performance measures, are likely to have little choice but 
to focus on short-term demands of short-term liquidity institutional investors.115 
 
The policy choices that the UK and Germany have long made on what interests are protected 
in regulating their markets have respectively resulted in liberal/short-termism and 
protectionist/long-termism.  During takeovers, UK disarms managers to promote shareholder 
interests, while Germany empowers managers to promote corporate interests.  Whilst the 
scope of this paper is not to discuss the normative value and effect of takeovers,116 suffice to 
state that economists have long argued that takeovers have a disciplinary effect that corrects 
the non-value-maximising practices of managers of target companies.117  Both UK and 
Germany economies have long entrenched their varied policy choices that a solution that gets 
both worlds is hard.  It has been decades since Richard Roberts and Alfred Chandler wrote 
about the policy choices taken by the UK and Germany, yet their works are still relevant. 
 
Richard Roberts observed that, in the UK, regulatory measure in 1951 and 1953 to curb 
‘speculation’ restricted the growth of takeovers, but subsequent regulatory measures in 1958 
and 1959 opened the market that led to the takeover booms of the 1960s – this change, a 
positive regulatory attitude to takeovers, came about, ‘because by then the authorities had 
come to regard take-overs as a means of promoting industrial rationalisation and instilling 
discipline in management.’118  We turn to the works of Alfred D Chandler.  Chandler argued 
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that it was by following the logic of dynamic managerial enterprise, allowing managers to 
take company decisions, which ‘helped to make Germany Europe’s most powerful industrial 
nation before World War I.’  That ‘more serious to the long-term health of enterprises and 
industries was the deliberate ignoring of that logic by managers who decided on a strategy of 
growth of acquiring companies in business in which they had little or no product-specific 
organizational capabilities that gave them a competitive edge.’  The wave of acquisitions in 
the UK in late 1960s suggests that managers ignored the logic of industrial growth, as they 
perceived, according to Chandler, ‘that often more money was to be made in buying and 
selling companies than in operating them.’119  In the UK, the 1960s saw a shift in business of 
financial firms from funding long-term reinvestments to funding short-term acquisitions. 
 
The rise of short-termism in the UK, and the trend of long-termism in Germany, fits the 
above historical account of policy choices.  In the UK, the authorities accepted hostile 
takeovers as a means of disciplining managers. To escape being disciplined, managers 
became active, not in running companies, but in buying and selling companies, as more 
money was made that way than in operating companies, which in turn breeds short-termism.  
In Germany, rather than seek to discipline managers, authorities empowered them to take 
company decisions.  Germany’s takeover rules favour wider corporate interests for which 
boards are duty bound to protect, which in turn facilitates long-termism. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
To address the question posed in the title of this paper, we must concede that it is hard in the 
current varied EU regulatory regimes.  Examining and comparing takeover law regimes, 
especially the application of the BNR, of the UK and Germany, has revealed that there are 
strongly entrenched policy positions in both jurisdictions.  There is a strict board neutrality 
regime in the UK, but also both the UK government and independent Reviews found 
prevalence of short-termism in the acclaimed liberal takeover market.  The BNR in Germany 
is illusory, hostile takeovers are not welcome, and recent European Parliament reports and 
Commission reports found a re-emergence of national protectionism.  It has been observed 
that, despite short-termism, the UK’s liberal market positions and affirms the UK as a 
regional financial centre, a position that would be weakened by protectionism.  It has also 
been observed that, despite protectionism, Germany’s long-termism positions and affirms 
Germany as one of the largest industrial economies. 
 
Germany opted out of Article 9, and although that was seen as protectionism, it enabled 
Germany to retain the traditional German corporate law model that serves wider corporate 
interests to ensure long-term sustainability of companies. The UK regulatory framework 
gives credence to the normative notion that companies should be run primarily in the interests 
of shareholders.  Long-term investment is hard because the interests of most institutional 
shareholders lie in making short-term profits.  Unless the culture of shareholders changes 
from short-termism to long-termism, UK regulators have no easy solution to short-termism, 
as shareholders may freely sell to short-term investors.  It has been argued that short-termism 
in the UK and the so-called protectionism in Germany, are the respective result of entrenched 
policy choices made in their regulation of the market for corporate control, and that it is hard 
for the UK and Germany to get the best of both worlds: liberal market and long-termism. 
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